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Abstract
Fiscal foresight, economic agents receiving information about future fiscal policy, affects
the consistency of results about the causal effects of government spending. This study
explores the propagation of government spending shocks using a noncausal VAR model
that allows for anticipation of exogenous fiscal policy changes. Overcoming the issue of
insufficient information, the government spending shock is extracted from an anticipated
error term by using institutional information about the conduct of fiscal policy. In addition,
the approach nests the conventional causal structural VAR as a special case. In the U.S.
economy, the identified spending shock comoves with defence expenditures. The shock
increases consumption, employment and output one and a half years prior to its
materialisation in government spending. After the shock arrives, real wages respond
positively while investment turns negative. The estimated fiscal multiplier is close to unity.
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1 Introduction
What is the impact of government spending on the economy? Despite a large body of
literature, disagreement prevails how an increase in government spending incorporates
into consumption, investment and output. To a great extent, the lack of consensus is
due to uncertainty about valid methods to identify exogenous fiscal policy changes and
to measure the reactions of economic agents. In particular, an identification strategy has
to take into consideration that a considerable part of policy measures is implemented
with a delay by the nature of political process. The economic agents thus foresee and
internalise the policies before they are observed as changes in government spending. If
agents’ expectations are not included to the empirical model, such fiscal foresight causes
an econometric obstacle of retrieving a government spending shock to study the reactions.
As the key tool to study the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, the vector au-
toregressive (VAR) model identifies the spending shock by imposing exclusion, sign or
medium-run restrictions, typically based on fiscal rules of the government (Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002; Galí et al., 2007; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Ben Zeev and Pappa, 2017).
However, shown by Ramey (2011b), a large part of exogenous changes in the U.S. gov-
ernment spending is related to the defence expenditures and is anticipated by war dates
as well as by professional forecasts. Consequently, the VAR model is at risk to identify
a shock that is anticipated by the economic agents, and the true propagation of a fiscal
policy shock cannot be revealed. In general, the problem relates to nonfundamentalness
as the economic agents possess more information than an econometrician and, therefore, it
is not possible to infer the structural shocks from the causal autoregressive representation
of the VAR model.1 As shown by Leeper et al. (2013), the fiscal foresight in a rational
expectations model inherently leads to the nonfundamentalness problem through a non-
invertible moving average (MA) representation for typical observables included to a VAR
model. Ignoring the anticipation of the shock may thus seriously distort the conclusions
drawn from the model.
The literature has tackled the fiscal foresight by including proxies for expectations of
economic agents based on narrative records, stock market data or professional forecasts
in an empirical model. The government spending shock is then recursively identified as
innovation to the proxy or by local projections following Jordà (2005).2 Following the
narrative approach, Ramey (2011b) constructed a proxy variable from administrative and
news sources about the expected exogenous changes in military spending over time, also
used in various subsequent studies to control for information. Using stock market data,
Fisher and Peters (2010) recovered the spending shock from the excess returns of U.S.
military contractors and Caggiano et al. (2015) from the revisions in the professional fore-
casters. However, the validity of all these approaches is subject to how well the additional
variable catches the information held by the public. Another possibility is to use Blaschke
1The literature about misspecifying the VAR model due to nonfundamentalness traces back to Hansen
and Sargent (1980), followed by Hansen and Sargent (1991) and Lippi and Reichlin (1994), and more
recently discussed in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2007), Lütkepohl (2014), Forni and Gambetti (2014) and
Beaudry and Portier (2014).
2For recent survey, see Leeper et al. (2013) and Ramey (2016).
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matrices to find the corresponding fundamental representation (see Mertens and Ravn
2010). These theoretical dynamic restrictions may, though, excessively limit the set of
possible propagation mechanisms.
I contribute to the fiscal policy literature by estimating the impact of government
spending with a noncausal model that implicitly controls for the expectations of the pub-
lic, while being flexible about the underlying economic process. I deviate from the conven-
tional VAR analysis by augmenting the specification with the lead terms of observables,
which corresponds to the noncausal VAR model of Lanne and Saikkonen (2013). Without
assuming the included variables to be informative enough, the future terms resolve the
nonfundamentalness problem as the predictable error term of the model may now contain
anticipated economic shocks. The impulse responses to the shocks are then derived from
the two-sided MA representation of the model which depends both on the past and future
errors.
In contrast to its causal counterpart, the noncausal model can be used to recover a
shock that may already be internalised by the economic agents. I parsimoniously identify
an anticipated spending shock using typical exclusion restrictions imposed on a fiscal
rule according to which the government responds to the recent shocks of the economy
with a lag. Under fiscal foresight, the model is able to show the impulse responses of
forward-looking variables to an anticipated government spending shock. By contrast,
when anticipation does not matter, the model reduces to a causal VAR model with the
exclusion restrictions following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). However, to distinguish
between causal and noncausal specifications, the estimation requires non-Gaussianity as
the models are observationally equivalent by their first and second moments only. To
that end, I assume multivariate t-distributed errors, under which the Gaussian structural
shocks share a volatility term and normality is nested as limiting case. Consequently, the
noncausal model can be estimated by a computationally efficient Gibbs sampler following
Lanne and Luoto (2016).
How government spending influences the economy is important for validating the con-
sistency of macroeconomic models as well as for designing fiscal policy. In the neoclassical
theory, government spending may either crowd out private consumption and investment
or stimulate the economy. The latter occurs when the economy involves nominal rigidities
and households are non-Ricardian, eventually leading to a fiscal multiplier larger than
one. Under flexible prices instead, spending causes negative consumption and real wage
responses as crowding out dominates. In the empirical literature, the exclusion restric-
tions based on the predetermined fiscal policy tend to produce positive consumption and
real wage responses, whereas the studies employing a proxy for expectations document
a decline of these variables (Ramey, 2016). In a straightforward manner, the noncausal
model is able to give insight to what extent these differences stem from the anticipation
of fiscal shocks.
Using the U.S. postwar data, I document non-negligible anticipation of macroeconomic
variables in the face of a spending shock. Investment mildly rises during the anticipation
phase before turning negative, and the shock increases consumption, employment and
real wage. These reactions imply a fiscal multiplier close to one, although it is estimated
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with high uncertainty. The identified shock is also closely related to defence spending,
commonly held as a source of exogeneity in the fiscal policy literature. Finally, I compare
my results on different, previously used identification strategies. First, the shock I identify
coincides over time with the one obtained by the short-run restrictions from the causal
VAR model. However, the impulse responses of the causal VAR incorrectly ignore the
anticipation phase and underestimate the size of fiscal multipliers. Second, the results are
insensitive to the inclusion of a proxy variable. Moreover, when examined in the noncausal
model, identification relying on the narrative proxy of Ramey (2011b) similar results.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the methodology based on
the noncausal VAR to identify government spending shocks and illustrates the approach
in a model of fiscal foresight. Section 3 explores the effects of government spending shocks
in the US economy. The last section concludes.
2 Theory
By the institutional structure of the government, introducing a new policy involves a lag
between legislation and implementation. When the economic agents see the forthcoming
policies, they are likely to hold richer information for decision-making than an econometri-
cian observes. As a result, a structural VAR model is unable to extract exogenous policy
changes from fiscal variables only. In this section, I propose an approach to recover a
government spending shock when allowing for the misalignment between the information
sets of the economic agents and the econometrician. First, I show how impulse responses
to the anticipated spending shock can be reproduced by means of noncausality. Second,
I illustrate the proposed approach analytically in a model of fiscal foresight. Finally, I
review the estimation of the model.
2.1 Identification of government spending shocks under anticipation
Let yt = (gt, y′2,t)′ be an n-dimensional vector of observables with the log of quarterly
real government spending gt = logGt and n − 1 remaining variables of interest collected
in vector y2,t. Assume the mutually uncorrelated structural shocks in ut propagate to yt
through the MA representation
yt =
∞∑
k=0
Bkut−k = B(L)ut, (1)
where ut = (ug,t, u′2,t)′ consists of the government spending shock ug,t and (n − 1) other
structural shocks of the economy u2,t, L is the usual lag operator and B(L) =
∑∞
k=0BkL
k
an (n× n) matrix polynomial convergent in the powers of L.
Conventionally, the identification of the government spending shock and the derivation
of the impulse responses of yt are based on the causal VAR(p) model
A(L)yt = εt, (2)
A(L) = In −A1L− . . .−ApLp, εt ∼ (0,Γ),
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with an MA representation
yt = A(L)−1εt =
∞∑
k=0
Ckεt−k = C(L)εt, (3)
which coincides with (1) as long as its one-step ahead forecast error is a linear combination
of structural shocks, i.e., yt − E[yt|yt−1, yt−2, . . .] = A(L)yt = εt = B0ut. Partition this
structural VAR model (2) asA11(L)1×1 A12(L)1×(n−1)
A21(L)
(n−1)×1
A22(L)
(n−1)×(n−1)

 gt1×1y2,t
(n−1)×1
 =
 ε1,t1×1ε2,t
(n−1)×1
 =
 b111×1 b121×(n−1)
b21
(n−1)×1
b22
(n−1)×(n−1)

 ug,t1×1u2,t
(n−1)×1
 . (4)
Tracing back to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) (BP, henceforth), the spending shock is iden-
tified from the system of equations (4) by imposing exclusion restrictions b12 = 01×(n−1).
Accordingly, based on the predetermined nature of economic policy, it takes at least a
quarter for the government to learn about the state of the economy and to implement any
measures in response. The spending shock ug,t is thus the only exogenous change that
both drives the current spending gt and is unrelated to the past states of the economy.3
However, changes in government spending captured by the identification of BP poten-
tially fails to represent the most recent, unexpected shock of the economy. In particular,
the identified shock in the U.S. data is related to defence spending and shown to be
predictable by information held by the public (Ramey, 2011b). Consequently, such fis-
cal foresight prevents the VAR model (2) from producing a forecast error unanticipated
both to the economic agents and the econometrician. The error is instead a linear com-
bination of past errors from which a static impact matrix B alone cannot recover the
structural shocks (Lippi and Reichlin, 1994). Consequently, the measured effects of gov-
ernment spending may be starkly distorted as the MA representation (3) cannot reveal
the underlying impulse responses to the shocks ut (Ramey, 2011b; Leeper et al., 2013).
The above nonfundamentalness problem boils down to the noninvertibility of the MA
representation as economic agents react based on broader information than the history of
yt contains.4 The invertibility of the MA representation (1) could be attained by enriching
yt with variables reflecting the information set of economic agents (Ramey, 2011b; Fisher
and Peters, 2010; Caggiano et al., 2015). Alternatively, imposing dynamic structure on the
nonfundamental error term, a Blaschke matrix would recover the spending shock (Mertens
and Ravn, 2010).5 However, while the former approach is subject to the ability of the
additional variables to establish invertibility and to identify relevant sources of exogeneity,
the latter approach may implicitly impose restrictive structure on the economic process.
3Originally, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identify both spending and tax shocks using a non-recursive
system that combines the exclusion restrictions b12 = 01×(n−1) with information about elasticities. Never-
theless, ignoring the tax shock and identifying the spending shock through recursive restrictions produces
similar results (Ramey, 2011b, 2016).
4In other words, yt is noninvertible in the past as there exist roots inside the unit circle for |B(z)|.
5In detail, Mertens and Ravn (2010) derive from a rational expectations model a Blaschke matrix that
maps the nonfundamental error term of the VAR model to the anticipated spending shock.
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As an alternative to the above approaches, consider a representation[
gt
y2,t
]
=
∞∑
k=0
Mkt−k +
[
0
f2,t
]
, (5)
whereM(L) = ∑∞k=0MkLk, M0 = In, is a convergent (n×n) MA polynomial invertible in
L and t ∼ (0, Γ¯) is an independent and identically distributed (iid) error term. In turn,
the (n− 1)-dimensional vector f2,t depends directly on the future values of yt:
f2,t = Φ21,1gt+1 + Φ22,1y2,t+1 + . . .+ Φ21,sgt+s + Φ22,sy2,t+s, (6)
where Φ21,k and Φ22,k for k = 1, . . . , s are ((n− 1)× 1) and ((n− 1)× (n− 1)) matrices,
respectively. In particular, the representation (5) differs from the invertible MA repre-
sentation (3) due to the inclusion of f2,t through which the forward-looking variables in
y2,t depend on the future error terms. The forward-looking variables thus react to the
future errors that realise in spending with a delay. Moreover, the conditional expectation
E[t+j |yt, yt−1, . . .], j > 0 is nonzero such that errors can be predicted by the past observed
variables, in contrast to the forecast error εt of the causal VAR.
Specifically, the representation (5) tackles the noninvertibility of the MA representation
(1) by allowing yt to depend on future structural shocks. That is, when the observables
induce noninvertibility of (1) to the past, f2,t ensures that the dynamics can be correctly
captured with respect to an anticipated error term. Hence, the future terms control for
the effects of omitted factors and expectations dismissed by the invertible MA polynomial
M(L). On the contrary, when the underlying MA representation (1) is invertible and the
causal VAR model is valid, f2,t is approximately zero as the lead terms become superfluous,
and the equation (5) reduces to the causal MA representation (3) with t = εt.
Now, from the representation (5), identify a government spending shock u¯g,t that is
allowed to be anticipated by the variables in y2,t. Assume the error term t is a static
rotation of the anticipated shocks u¯t, containing current or lagged values of the underly-
ing, unanticipated structural shocks ut. The uncorrelated structural shocks u¯ with unit
variance are mapped into the error term as
t = B¯u¯t, (7)
and B¯ satisfies E[t′t] = Γ¯ = B¯B¯′. Let the first row of B¯ be [b¯11 b¯12] with scalar b¯11 and a
row vector b¯12 of dimension n− 1. Noting that M0 = In, by (5), the impact effect of the
current structural shocks on government spending gt is equal to
1,t = b¯11u¯g,t + b¯12u¯2,t. (8)
Imposing b¯12 = 01×(n−1), government follows a fiscal rule where spending is predetermined
within one quarter except for exogenous changes due to u¯g,t. In other words, the fiscal
policy responds contemporaneously only to its own shock in addition to the past variation.
By the above scheme, the spending shock is identified by the strategy of BP but relaxed
to be anticipated through term f2,t, leaving gt unchanged prior to t. For f2,t = 0(n−1)×1,
5
the identification reduces to the original scheme (4) and recovers an unanticipated spending
shock analogous to BP. Under noninvertibility instead, the past observables are incapable
of recovering the fundamental shock which can then be obtained with the help of f2,t.
It should, however, be noted that the representations (1) and (5) are not necessarily
equivalent in a way that the former could directly be rewritten in terms of u¯t and ft
as the latter. A direct mapping may instead only exist if specific structure is imposed
on the underlying economic model. The approach is rather a parsimonious departure
from invertibility to approximate the true process and to flexibly identify an anticipated
government spending shock. The representation (5) additionally covers a wider range of
underlying economic dynamics and forms of anticipation than a causal VAR model (2)
alone.
The model (5) can be estimated with a noncausal VAR(r,s) model of Lanne and
Saikkonen (2013)
Π(L)Φ(L−1)yt = t, (9)
where
Φ(L−1) = I − Φ1L−1 − . . .− Φ−ss ,
Φi =
[
0 01×(n−1)
Φ21,i Φ22,i
]
, i = 1, . . . , s.
and Π(L) = I −Π1L− . . .−ΠrLr. To see this, write the representation (14) equivalently
as
Φ(L−1)yt = M(L)t,
where M(L) can be inverted to the left-hand side and its inverse be approximated up to
a truncation error with the causal polynomial Π(L).
The impulse responses to the identified shock u¯g,t are derived from the two-sided MA
representation of the model,
yt = Φ(L−1)−1Π(L)−1t =
∞∑
k=−∞
ΨkB¯u¯t−k (10)
through which yt generally depends both on the past and future shocks. Hence, the
impulse responses to a government spending shock are derived from
∂yt+k
∂u¯g,t
= Ψk b¯1, k = . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . (11)
where b¯1 is the first column of matrix B¯, derived from Γ¯ = B¯B¯′ after imposing the
exclusion restrictions.6 By the stability of the matrix polynomials Π(L) and Φ(L−1), the
coefficients Ψk decay to zero as k → ±∞.7 Despite the infinite number of lead terms,
the two-sided representation approximates the true model (1) but shows the responses
of the most recent shocks at the negative lags with coefficients close to zero beyond the
anticipation horizon of the economic agents.
6In practice, B¯ is derived as lower triangular matrix from the Cholesky decomposition of Γ¯.
7The stability is ensured by det Π(z) 6= 0 and det Φ(z) 6= 0 for |z| ≤ 1.
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2.2 Analytical example: a model of fiscal foresight
Next, I illustrate in an example of fiscal foresight from Leeper et al. (2013) how nonin-
vertibility can be resolved by the above noncausal approach. In this particular setting, a
mapping from the theoretical noninvertible model to the noncausal VAR exists.
In the model, a representative household maximises the sum of expected future utility,
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t logCt, by deciding upon consumption under perfect depreciation of capital Kt,
exogenous productivity At and a proportional tax τt on production, τtYt = τtAtKαt−1
which is redistributed by the government through lump-sum transfers Tt. By optimising
subject to the resulting budget constraint Ct + Kt + Tt ≤ (1 − τt)AtKαt−1, log-linearising
and assuming that at = logAt − logA is uncorrelated, the solution for capital becomes
kt = αkt−1 + at + (1− θ) τ1− τ
∞∑
i=0
θiEtτˆt+i+1, (12)
where θ = αβ(1− τ) < 1 and kt, at and τˆt are log-deviations from the steady state.
Consider now agents observing a perfect signal on tax rate q periods forward, i.e., τˆt =
uτ,t−q. Furthermore, let at = uA,t and assume uA,t and uτ,t are uncorrelated. Substituting
these to the solution yields
kt = αkt−1 + uA,t − κ(uτ,t−q+2 + θuτ,t−q+1 + . . .+ θq−1uτ,t), (13)
where κ = (1− θ)τ/(1− τ). Under foresight, q > 0, present capital is influenced in a way
that the most recent news informative about the most distant tax rates is discounted the
heaviest by anticipation rate θ. By this inverse discounting, the history of observables is
likely insufficient to recover the most recent shocks as they have the least weight on the
current dynamics.8 In particular, the MA representation of the observables yt = (τˆt, kt)′,[
τˆt
kt
]
=
[
Lq 0
−κLq−1+θLq−2+...+θq−11−αL 11−αL
] [
uτ,t
uA,t
]
= B(L)ut, (14)
is noninvertible in the past since |B(z)| = zq = 0 for z = 0, inducing absence of a causal
VAR representation.9
Nonetheless, yt is noncausal of the form (5). For q = 2, rewrite kt as
kt =− κ L+ θ1− αLuτ,t +
1
1− αLuA,t
=− κθτt+2 − κ(1 + θα)τt+1 − κα 1 + αθ1− αLuτ,t−2 +
1
1− αLuA,t,
where uτ,t and uτ,t−1 as signals about future tax rates are substituted out using uτ,t = τˆt+2.
This leads to the representation of the form (5) for yt,[
1 0
κ((1 + θα)L−1 + θL−2) 1
] [
τˆt
kt
]
=
[
1 0
0 11−αL
] [
1 0
−κα(1 + θa) 1
] [
uτ,t−2
uA,t
]
,
8See Leeper et al. (2013) for deeper evaluation.
9Leeper et al. (2013) additionally show that the nonfundamental representation produced by a causal
VAR can severely misinterpret the effects of tax shocks. Ramey (2009) demonstrates with Monte Carlo
evidence that noninvertibility has similar consequences on the inference about government spending shocks.
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and multiplying from the left by the inverse of the MA polynomial on the right-hand side,[
1 0
0 1− αL
] [
1 0
κ((1 + θα)L−1 + θL−2) 1
] [
τˆt
kt
]
= t (15)
which is the noncausal VAR(1,2) model (9) with
t = B¯u¯t, B¯ =
[
1 0
−ακ(1 + θa) 1
]
, u¯t =
[
uτ,t−2
uA,t
]
.
The error term t in (15) contains now shocks uτ,t−2 and uA,t, the former being antici-
pated by the economic agents. Moreover, (τˆt, kt)′ has a two-sided MA representation (10)
and, as a result, their impulse responses with respect to a tax shock uτ,t−2 read as
∂yt+k
∂uτ,t−2
= Ψk b¯1, k = . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . . (16)
The impulse responses from the noncausal VAR model can thus be derived in a conven-
tional manner but they additionally are located at the negative lags due to the different
time-indexing of the shock. In particular, this time-shifting occurs as noninvertibility pre-
vents obtaining the shock as unanticipated using the current and past values of yt only.
Noncausality facilitates then the recovery of an anticipated shock corresponding to the
lagged underlying shock. Figure 1 depicts the impulse responses from the theoretical and
noncausal models in the upper and lower plots, respectively, and confirms the equivalence
of the MA representations (1) and (10) in this set-up. Evidently, the impulse responses
coincide, but through the two-sided MA representation of the noncausal VAR, the timing
of the tax shock differs, the anticipation effects hitting at negative lags on capital. The
policy shock thus influences capital already at negative k of Ψk but those responses are
zero at leads beyond k = −2.
2.3 Estimation
Next, I outline the estimation of the noncausal VAR(r,s) model (9). I rely on Bayesian
methods to tackle the large parameter space arising due to the additional lead terms. I
therefore closely follow Lanne and Luoto (2016) who derive a Metropolis-within-Gibbs
sampler for the model.10
To identify a noncausal VAR(r,s) from a causal VAR(r + s) model, it is necessary
deviate from Gaussianity as the models are observationally equivalent in terms of first and
second moments only and cannot be distinguished under normality. In what follows, the
error term t is assumed to be multivariate t-distributed, implying unique identification
of the model parameters through its likelihood function.11 The noncausal VAR is then
equivalently written as
ω
1/2
t Π(L)Φ(L−1)yt = ηt, (17)
10Lanne and Saikkonen (2013) propose maximum likelihood estimation of the model.
11For details on identifiability, see Lanne and Saikkonen (2013).
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions of the fiscal foresight model to a technology and an
anticipated tax shock
The upper panel corresponds to the theoretical impulse responses obtained from the solution. The lower graphs
plot the impulse responses obtained from the noncausal VAR(1,2) model.
where λωt is χ2λ-distributed and ηt ∼ N(0,Σ) such that Γ¯ = E[t′t] = λλ−2Σ. Hence, the
error distribution is Gaussian conditional on scalar volatility term ω−1/2t that controls for
leptokurtosis of the time series, i.e., ωt catches exogenous, common volatility in observ-
ables. For small λ, the distribution has fatter tails than under normality. On the other
hand, the distribution is closer to Gaussianity for large values of λ. As under normality,
ηt is a linear combination of the Gaussian structural shocks which are recovered through
rotation matrix B¯.12
For estimation, the model has a conditional likelihood function shown in Appendix A.1
and a computationally feasible posterior distribution under prior distributions standard
in the Bayesian VAR literature. Let vectors pi and φr collect the parameters of the lag
and lead terms, respectively. Exploiting (17) and the multiplicative structure of (9), the
conditional posterior distribution of parameters is (see Appendix A.1 for details)
φr|y, pi,Σ, ω ∼N(φ¯r, V¯φr)I(φ)
pi|y, φr,Σ, ω ∼N(p¯i, V¯pi)I(pi)
Σ|y, pi, φr, ω ∼iW(S¯, ν¯),
where matrices φ¯r, V¯φr , p¯i, V¯pi, S¯, ν¯ are functions of data and hyperparameters and I(·)
is indicator function equal to 1 when the polynomial to which pi or φ is mapped is stable.
12The distributional assumption implies that ηt may contain both anticipated and unanticipated struc-
tural shocks that share the same volatility term. Avoiding this potential caveat would require a less
parsimonious empirical strategy such as considering an alternative non-Gaussian distribution.
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Finally, ω = (ωr+1, . . . , ωT−s) and λ are jointly drawn from(
λ+ t(ϑ)′Σ−1t(ϑ)
)
ωt|y, pi, φr,Σ, λ ∼ χ2(λ+ n), t = r + 1, . . . , T − s,
and by a Metropolis-within-Gibbs step from a kernel for λ conditional on y and ω.
3 The impact of government spending in the U.S. economy
This section studies what are the implications of an exogenous change in government
spending in the U.S. economy. According to the economic theory, the effects of a govern-
ment spending shock hinge on the interaction of wealth, intertemporal and distortionary
effects (Ramey, 2011a). If the wealth effect of labour supply dominates, the Ricardian
households decrease both consumption and investment in response to the increased spend-
ing, and crowding-out effects imply a fiscal multiplier smaller than one. In contrast, when
the economy involves non-Ricardian and Keynesian elements, a spending shock is instead
followed by increasing marginal product of labour and consequently by rising wages, lead-
ing to a positive consumption response and stimulative effects of fiscal policy.13 Finally,
distortionary taxation to finance spending dampens the positive effects on consumption,
employment and output.
However, validating the effects of government spending poses the econometric chal-
lenge due to the fiscal foresight. The noncausal VAR used for the analysis overcomes
this issue as the government spending shock may be anticipated. In particular, the ap-
proach retains the VAR methodology with the conventional exclusion restrictions, without
assuming additional variables to account for the foresight.
3.1 Data and estimation
I use the following U.S. quarterly macroeconomic data. My measure of government spend-
ing is government consumption expenditures and gross investment. Output is measured by
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), consumption by the sum of consumption of nondurables
and services, and investment consists of fixed private investment and consumption of
durables. These national accounts variables, taken from the National Income and Prod-
uct Accounts (NIPA) Tables of Bureau of Economic Analysis, are transformed into real
values by the GDP deflator, into per-capita terms by civilian noninstitutional population
and expressed in logs. Employment and wages are log per-capita hours and the log real
hourly compensation, respectively, from the nonfarm business sector. I derive the average
tax rate as all federal receipts divided by the nominal GDP. These seven variables, from
which I subtract their quadratic trend, compound the baseline specification and span the
quarters from 1945Q1 to 2013Q4. Additionally, I consider annualised inflation, computed
as a log difference of GDP deflator, and two interest rates, the 3-month T-bill rate and
the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, the latter being available from the second
quarter of 1953 onwards.
13See Galí et al. (2007) and Ramey (2011a) for more in-depth discussion on propagation mechanisms of
government spending.
10
Figure 2: Posterior distribution of degrees-of-freedom parameter λ
Posterior draws of λ from the baseline noncausal VAR. The dashed vertical line is the posterior mean.
The noncausal VAR(r,s) models I estimate include the above variables with the number
of lags and leads set to four. Allowing for r = 4 lags, on the one hand, allows observables to
have an invertible MA polynomial M(L) in (5) general enough to fully catch the variation
of structural shocks in the absence of nonfundamentalness. On the other hand, s = 4
leads imply rich structure for the noncausal part f2,t if observables are nonfundamental as
a result of anticipation. Together, the resulting two-sided MA representation is expected
to be general enough to recover the underlying, possibly noninvertible MA representation
(1).
I estimate the model with Bayesian methods due to the large parameter space and set
a Minnesota-Litterman-type prior distribution as also used by Lanne and Luoto (2016),
explained in Appendix A.1. Specifically, I control for tightness of the prior distribution
separately for the lag and lead coefficients. By adjusting these overall tightness parameters,
the prior about the lag coefficients is less informative, whereas the lead coefficients are
shrunk more strongly towards zero. Hence, a priori, the lag terms are more important
to determine the dynamics of variables. I proceed by drawing 50,000 times from the
posterior distribution. For each draw, I derive the MA representation (10) and impose the
exclusion restrictions using Cholesky decomposition Γ¯ = B¯B¯′. As for any Gibbs sampler,
the algorithm to obtain posterior draws performs well when the distribution is unimodal.
Multimodality, though, easily arises in the estimation of the noncausal VAR, as observed
by Lanne and Luoto (2016). Nonetheless, the less loose prior distribution for φr by the
greater overall tightness and the restrictions imposed in (9) are powerful in attaining a
unimodal posterior distribution.
For identifying a unique VAR(r,s) specification, it is necessary to assume non-Gaus-
sianity of the error term. However, the assumed multivariate t-distribution nests Gaus-
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to the government spending shock from the baseline model
Solid lines and dashed lines are the median impulse responses from the noncausal VAR(4,4) and causal VAR(4)
models, respectively, to a one standard deviation government spending shock. The dark and light grey shaded
regions are the 68 and 90 per cent, respectively, credible sets of the estimated impulse responses from the noncausal
model.
sianity for large degrees-of-freedom parameter λ. Low estimates of λ thus immediately
suggests the validity of the distributional assumption compared to Gaussianity, implied
by excess kurtosis in the error distribution. In Figure 2, I plot the histogram of the pos-
terior draws of λ from the baseline VAR model. The histogram clearly indicates that a
large probability mass is located at low degrees of freedom. Moreover, the data strongly
dominate the assumed prior mean 10 of λ with a posterior mean of 4.2: the probability
of λ being greater than 6 is extremely low. Therefore, the data lend support for the
multivariate t-distribution, which facilitates the identification of the noncausal model.
3.2 Impulse responses to a government spending shock
In Figure 3, the solid lines depict the estimated impulse responses to a one standard devi-
ation government spending shock to the seven variables included in the baseline noncausal
VAR(4,4) model. Therein, I also report the posterior medians of the estimates together
with the 68 and 90 percent credible sets.14 Because of noncausality, the responses are
located both at the negative and positive lags, the former being estimated close to zero
beyond lead 10.
According to the noncausal model, government spending increases by one per cent
over its trend and output peaks at 0.3 per cent in response to a spending shock u¯g,t. The
shock materialises in spending from time 0 onwards, implied by the zero restrictions on
14Both the posterior median and the credible sets are found by computing the periodwise quantiles from
the impulse responses implied by the draws of θ.
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the lead terms, while the other variables anticipate this increase from quarter -6 onwards.
Except for investment and wages, this anticipation is measured to be statistically signif-
icant at the 90 percent level. GDP reacts approximately one and a half years ahead of
the future spending increase. Simultaneously, consumption starts to increase and peaks
at the realisation of the shock. On the other hand, investment turns negative soon after
the shock arrives, remaining below its trend for the subsequent quarters. Hours worked
move fast and positively at the anticipation lags and stay over the trend for the following
10 quarters after starting to decrease at the materialisation of the shock. The real wage
exhibits a hump-shaped increase, which occurs simultaneously with the decline of hours.
Last, the initially, during the anticipation phase increasing average tax rate implies that
the induced spending is at least partly tax-funded.
I continue by augmenting the above baseline VAR model with inflation, the short-
term rate and the term spread, where the latter is defined as the difference between
the 10-year and 3-month rates. As the estimates regarding the seven variable above are
indistinguishable from the above results (see Appendix A.2), in panel (a) of Figure 4, I
report for the sake of space solely the responses of the three additional variables from this
ten-variable VAR(4,4) model.15 A one percent, exogenous increase in government spending
has a small, negative impact on inflation that decreases by 0.15 percentage points. The
3-month rate remains mildly negative during the propagation of the shock, and these two
reactions together imply a 0.1 percentage point increase in the ex-post real interest rate.
Originating from a smaller change observed in the 10-year rate, the spending shock leads
to a higher slope of the term structure, although the effect is insignificant at the most
lags.
Above, the spending shock caused a positive reaction of consumption and initially
increasing but eventually below-trend-level declining investment. For a more in-depth
analysis, I replace consumption and investment with their subcomponents in the base-
line VAR. Panel (b) of Figure 4 plots the responses of disaggregated consumption and
investment components from the re-estimated noncausal VAR(4,4).16 Both services and
nondurable consumption respond significantly and positively to a spending shock, which
translates to the previously documented increase of the aggregate consumption. Invest-
ment moves mainly due to the reactions of residential and nonresidential investment as
durable consumption shows no significant reaction.
Figure 5 plots the four-quarter moving average of the identified shock from the base-
line noncausal model together with federal spending divided into three components, con-
sumption expenditures and gross investment on national defence, and non-defence federal
spending. Accordingly, the spending shock is closely related to the U.S. defence expendi-
tures, although the link has become somewhat weaker in the past three decades.17 The
spending shock series leads consumption and investment components of defence expendi-
15In this specification, data are available only from 1952Q2 onwards. However, the results remain nearly
indistinguishable from those of Figure 4 when the 10-year rate is omitted and the model is estimated on
data starting from 1945Q1.
16Appendix A.2 shows the responses of the other variables included to the model and they coincide with
the results from the baseline model.
17The relationship becomes the more evident the longer moving average is taken.
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(a) Inflation and interest rates
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(b) Consumption and investment components
Figure 4: Impulse responses to the government spending shock from the VAR models with
additional variables
Solid lines and dashed lines are the median impulse responses from the noncausal VAR(4,4) and causal VAR(4)
models, respectively, to a one-standard deviation government spending shock. The dark and light grey shaded
regions are the 68 and 90 per cent, respectively, credible sets of the estimated impulse responses from the noncausal
model. The impulse responses in panel (a) are from the 10-variable VAR including the baseline and the plotted
variables. The impulse respones in panel (b) are computed from the 10-variable VAR including the baseline variables
but consumption and investment replaced by the variables shown.
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Figure 5: Spending shock, defence and non-defence expenditures
The solid, light grey line depicts the posterior median of the 4-quarter moving average of the spending shock identified
from the baseline noncausal VAR(4,4). Dot-dashed and dashed lines are the log real national defense consumption
expenditures and gross investment, respectively. Dotted line refers to the log of real federal non-defence consumption
expenditures and gross investment. All variables are demeaned and standardised.
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tures by one year and is unrelated to the non-defence spending. By these observations, the
shock can be characterised by two insights. First, the great persistence of the shock ob-
served in the impulse responses is likely to stem from the nature of defence spending, from
decade-lasting military build-ups and wars that the United States was engaged in. Sec-
ond, the shock is unrelated to the non-defence component of federal spending. It induces
instead variation belonging to a particular class of events, the U.S. military expenditures,
which likely are orthogonal to the present state of the economy and which have been used
to identify exogenous events in spending in the existing literature.18
By the noncausal model, it was possible to identify a spending shock that may be
predictable to the economic agents, without ruling out causality a priori. To assess the
importance of the lead terms, Figures 3 and 4 included in dashed lines the impulse re-
sponses from the causal VAR(4) models to an unanticipated spending shock following the
identification of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Setting s = 0 and disregarding noncausal-
ity, the estimates remain close to their noncausal counterparts at the positive lags with the
exception of hours and tax rate that respond only mildly. However, by construction, the
causal VAR ignores the responses at the negative lags, despite the fact that the shock may
well be anticipated. Moreover, as shown in Figure A.2 in Appendix A.2, the shock iden-
tified from the causal VAR virtually coincides over time with the one from the noncausal
model. In other words, the causal VAR recovers a shock that aligns with the shock from
the noncausal model, but only the latter is able to show the reactions at the anticipatory,
negative lags. A causal VAR model under the exclusion restrictions is thus at high risk to
catch defence-spending-related events that the economic agents are able to forecast.
In view of the economic theory, I interpret the results as follows. The increase of
both output and employment in response to the anticipated spending shock suggests the
dominance of the wealth over substitution effects of the households. Moreover, as the shock
induces profound increases both in real wage and consumption, there is evidence, to some
extent, on the existence of non-Ricardian and Keynesian mechanisms. On the other hand,
the eventual decrease of investment suggests crowding out of private business. The path
of investment is mostly due to the non-household components as durable consumption or
residential investment show no significant reactions. Somewhat surprisingly, the shock has
deflationary effects on the price level in contrast with the neoclassical theory and positively
reacting consumption.19
3.3 The size of fiscal multiplier
Does government spending stimulate the economy? A fiscal multiplier larger than one
indicates that an increase in government spending boosts private economy in a way that
the benefits dominate the crowding-out and distortionary effects of public consumption
and taxation. The spending literature calculates the multiplier by two alternative ways,
either as a peak output response relative to the initial government spending impact effect
18U.S. defence spending and military events are regarded as sources of exogenous variation, amongst
others, by Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Fisher and Peters (2010), Ramey (2011b) and Ben Zeev and Pappa
(2017).
19The deflationary effects have also been observed by Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
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Figure 6: Histogram of posterior draws for fiscal multipliers on different horizons H2
The multipliers are computed using (18) with H1 = −10 and based on the baseline noncausal VAR(4,4) model.
Quantities on the y-axis are normalised such that histograms integrate to 1. Dotted vertical lines are the medians
of the multipliers. The red dashed lines are the median fiscal multipliers from the corresponding causal VAR(4)
model.
or as a ratio of present value integral of the output response to the integral government
spending response. I follow the latter technique, also suggested by Mountford and Uhlig
(2009) and Ramey (2016), as the former method tends to overestimate the size of fiscal
multiplier. In addition, the latter takes more flexibly timing, persistence and anticipation
of the shock into account. The fiscal multiplier is defined as∑H2
k=H1(1 + r)
−(k−H1) ∂ logGDPt+k
∂u¯g,t∑H2
k=H1(1 + r)−(k−H1)
∂ logGt+k
∂u¯g,t
GDP
G
, (18)
where H1 is set to -10, to the time point of initial reactions according to Figure 4, H2 is
the length of horizon after the shock has realised and r is the long-run real interest rate
computed as a sample mean of the difference between the T-bill rate and inflation. Last,
GDP/G is the sample mean of the ratio of GDP to government spending and converts
the percentage deviations to monetary units in real terms.
Figure 6 reports the posterior distribution of the fiscal multiplier computed by (18) and
their medians in dotted lines for various horizons. Under shorter horizons, H2 ∈ {0, 5, 10},
in the upper plots, the median multiplier is above one, being the largest when only the
impact effect of government spending is included, H2 = 0. Eventually, the size converges
towards one with longer horizons, as seen in the lower graphs. The impulse responses
of Figure 3 reveal the mechanism behind this pattern. Government spending showing
persistent increase simultaneously with the fast return of GDP to its trend level, the size
of multiplier decreases once more inputs are added to the denominator of (18).
Overall, there is great uncertainty whether government spending can be stimulative,
seen as large dispersions in the posterior distributions of Figure 6. Even for the shorter
17
horizons, a significant portion of the probability mass is concentrated on the region below
one, and the long-run multiplier with H2 = 40 reaches with high probability both positive
and negative values. It is also noteworthy to mention that the multiplier computed here is
not purely deficit-based as government spending is accompanied by a distortionary increase
in tax rate.20 In light of this evidence, the overall impact of the identified exogenous
government spending on the private economy remains imprecise.21
Finally, I draw in dashed lines the posterior medians of fiscal multipliers computed
from the causal VAR(4) model with the baseline variables. At all horizons, the multipliers
are quantified to be smaller than their corresponding estimates from the noncausal model.
Strikingly, despite the positive response of consumption, the causal VAR model with the
BP identification has a tendency to produce small multipliers (see also, Ramey, 2016).
This well-known controversy can be explained from the causal responses shown in Figure
3. As the causal structural VAR model disregards the anticipation effect in GDP, the
nominator of (18) is necessarily smaller relative to the denominator, which results in a
smaller multiplier.
3.4 Relation to the proxies and and narrative measures
In the government spending literature, the fiscal foresight and nonfundamentalness have
been approached by using a proxy variable either to enrich the information set of a VAR
model or to derive the responses to a shock using local projections (Jordà, 2005). By the
exclusion restrictions imposed on the error term of the noncausal model (9), the anticipated
spending shock can instead be recovered independent of the nonfundamentalness issue
exploiting the predetermined nature of government policy. Importantly, including a proxy
to the noncausal VAR can then shed light on how informative the variable is about the
identified shock.
Concluded from Figure 5, the shock identified in the noncausal VAR reflects defence
expenditures, and I thus consider two prominent proxies used in the literature, the narra-
tive defence news and the excess returns of military contractors. First, Ramey’s narrative
news (Ramey, 2011b) measures information held by the public about the expected dis-
counted value of government spending changes due to foreign policy events. On the other
hand, the Fisher-Peters excess returns (Fisher and Peters, 2010) aims to gauge the market
expectations about future spending by the returns of top three U.S. military contractors.22
According to Fisher and Peters (2010), the difference between these series stems from the
20Owyang et al. (2013) and Ramey (2016) argue that a trend in the GDP-to-spending ratio leads to a
bias in the multiplier estimates computed using (18). I reproduced, for robustness, impulse responses and
fiscal multipliers by transforming the national accounts variables with the Gordon-Krenn transformation
as the authors suggest. The results both remain qualitatively and are of the same magnitude as those
produced in this section.
21One possible explanation for this uncertainty may be the time-dependence in the effectiveness of fiscal
policy, as examined by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Owyang et al. (2013) and Caggiano et al.
(2015).
22The defence news variable and Fisher-Peters excess returns are available as supplementary data for
Ramey (2016) in Valerie Ramey’s webpage. The narrative news series, extended by Owyang et al. (2013),
spans the whole post-war period until 2013Q4 whereas the last observation for Fisher-Peters data is 2007Q4.
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Figure 7: The identified spending shock, Fisher-Peters excess returns and Ramey’s narra-
tive news
Grey solid line depicts the median of identified anticipated spending shocks from the baseline VAR(4,4) model, the
blue solid line the Ramey (2011b) narrative news of anticipated goverment spending, measured as a share of future
government spending of GDP and the black dashed line the excess returns of military contractors constructed by
Fisher and Peters (2010).
fact that market expectations about military spending evolve in a more nuanced way than
the immediate changes seen in the Ramey’s news series. However, Ramey (2016) argues
the excess returns series has low instrumental relevance for government spending.
In Figure 7, I plot the proxy variables along with the identified government spending
shock estimated from the baseline noncausal VAR(4,4) model. The shock spikes during
military events, similar to the the narrative defence news, most notably during the Korean
and Vietnam wars at the beginning of 1950s and 1970s, respectively. The Fisher-Peters
excess returns comoves with the shock during the 1960s and 1970s as well as during Ronald
Reagan’s presidency. However, neither of the series is a direct empirical representative of
the identified shock.
I continue by adding the proxy variables to the baseline noncausal VAR and allow
them to anticipate the shock identified by the exclusion restriction. As expected, a shock-
related proxy would respond positively to the future spending increase. Figure 8 graphs
the median impulse responses of government spending, GDP and the two respective proxy
variables to a one standard deviation shock identified by the exclusion restrictions in both
models where the eighth variable is either the narrative news or the Fisher-Peters excess
returns.23 Accordingly, the exclusion or inclusion of either of the proxies does not alter
23The excess returns being available only until 2007Q4, the second model spans a shorter time period.
However, the results from the baseline model or from the specification with Ramey’s narrative news do
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Figure 8: Impulse responses from the VAR models with a proxy variable
Black marked solid lines and blue solid lines are the posterior median impulse responses to the anticipated spending
shock from the noncausal VAR(4,4) models augmented with Ramey’s narrative news and the Fisher-Peters excess
returns, respectively. The dark and light grey shaded regions are the 68 and 90 percent posterior credible sets,
respectively, shown in the responses of spending, GDP and Ramey’s news from the former and in the response of
excess returns from the latter VAR model.
the estimates about the responses of government spending and GDP. Moreover, the shock
induces no significant reactions in the proxies, Ramey’s news variable responding only
slightly positively before the realisation moment.
The relevance of the spending shock can also be analysed by means of its relative
contribution to the overall movements in a variable. Formally, the ith variable in the
noncausal VAR has an MA representation
yi,t = e′i
∞∑
k=−∞
Ψk
(
b¯1u¯1,t−k + b¯2u¯2,t−k
)
, (19)
where ei = (0, ..., 1, ..., 0)′ with 1 in its ith element and an (n× (n− 1)) matrix b¯2 consists
of columns of B¯ corresponding to the n − 1 remaining shocks contained in u¯2,t−k. Now,
define the fraction of variance of yi,t due to the government spending shock u¯g,t over
horizon [H1, H2] as
ρ(yi,t;H1, H2) =
∑H2
k=H1 e
′
iΨk b¯1b¯′1Ψ′kei∑H2
k=H1 e
′
iΨkΣΨ′kei
. (20)
Under causality, the fraction (20) reduces to the forecast error variance decomposition of
a VAR model over horizon H2. Once s > 0, ρ(yi,t;H1, H2) generally gives the fraction of
the unconditional variance of variable yi,t explained by the spending shock. In panel (a)
of Table 1, I report these fractions in the baseline model and in the models with a proxy
variable. The identified shock explains now over 50 per cent of the detrended variation
in government spending and approximately 10 per cent in output. In contrast, the shock
contributes minimally to the movements in Ramey’s news and the excess returns variables.
Hence, the proxies are unrelated to the shock identified by the exclusion restriction, which
translates to the negligible reactions seen in Figure 8.
Does the use of identification based on proxies lead to different conclusions about
the effects of government spending? The mild responses of the proxies to the spending
not alter when using data up to 2007Q4.
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Panel (a) Identification by the exclusion restrictions
Baseline VAR Baseline + Ramey Baseline + F-P
Horizon (H2) gt GDPt gt GDPt Ramey gt GDPt F-P
0 100.00 10.34 100.00 10.42 1.81 100.00 9.30 0.80
5 95.35 10.77 94.97 11.63 2.46 92.45 13.47 0.86
10 87.79 9.60 88.22 11.34 2.73 82.48 15.94 1.32
20 72.92 7.67 76.23 10.14 2.90 67.66 18.65 2.40
30 60.73 6.70 66.54 8.77 2.96 59.57 19.46 3.46
40 51.77 6.63 58.69 8.13 3.01 55.16 19.47 4.18
Panel (b) Identification by the proxy variables
Baseline + Ramey Baseline + F-P
Horizon (H2) gt GDPt Ramey gt GDPt F-P
0 0.43 0.30 93.63 0.94 3.76 85.11
5 0.60 0.32 88.28 1.53 3.03 92.67
10 0.55 0.34 86.96 2.76 3.62 92.80
20 0.50 0.36 85.96 5.70 4.86 88.92
30 0.49 0.37 85.46 8.10 5.91 84.26
40 0.50 0.38 85.09 9.67 6.72 80.77
Table 1: Fractions of variance contributed by the spending shock
The shares shown in percentages are computed using (20) with H1 = −10 as posterior medians. Baseline + Ramey
refers to the VAR(4,4) model with the seven baseline variables and the Ramey news, Baseline + F-P to the VAR(4,4)
model with the baseline variables and the Fisher-Peters excess returns. In panel (b), the identification is proceeded
by the approach maximising the contribution of the shock to the eighth variable, explained in text.
shock and their small contributions suggest that the changes in the proxy variables about
defence expenditures consist of events different from those captured by the identified shock.
Nonetheless, these events – provided they are exogenous – may induce effects similar to
the structurally identified shock. I therefore derive impulse responses to a shock identified
by the variation of a proxy. In both of the augmented eight-variable models above, I
proceed by finding a shock that explains the most of the overall movements of the proxy,
i.e., it maximises the fraction of variance (20) among all possible linear mappings from
structural shocks to the reduced-form error term.24 Given the proxy is mainly driven by
the exogenous variation that translates to changes in spending, the identification strategy
is valid to recover the causal effects.
Panel (b) of Table 1 reports the shares contributed by these two alternatively identified
shocks to the unconditional variance of government spending, GDP and the respective
proxy. A single shock is able to explain the major part of the variance of the proxy.
However, the shocks barely influence the overall detrended variation of spending and
GDP. In Figure 9, I report the results from all identification strategies. First, the blue
solid and black marked solid lines draw the impulse responses to the shock identified by
the standard exclusion restriction from the augmented models. They are identical to those
24Appendix A.3 shows in detail that this identification can be achieved through an eigenvalue problem,
similar to the MaxVar approach (Uhlig, 2004; Francis et al., 2014) which rotates the error of a VAR model
to find the shock that maximises its amount to the forecast error variance.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses from the VAR Models including a proxy variable and with
the alternative identification strategy
Black marked solid lines and blue solid lines are the posterior median impulse responses to the shock identified by
the exclusion restrictions from the noncausal VAR(4,4) models augmented with Ramey’s narrative news and the
Fisher-Peters excess returns, respectively. The black dashed and blue dot-dashed lines are the responses to the
alternatively identified Ramey and Fisher-Peters shocks, respectively. The dark and light grey shaded regions are
the 68 and 90 percent posterior credible sets, respectively, shown for the baseline variables and the narrative news
from the model with Ramey’s news and for the excess returns from the second VAR model.
in Figure 8 but are rescaled by normalising the maximum impact on spending to one per
cent. Second, the black dashed and blue dashed-dotted lines depict the responses to the
Ramey and Fisher-Peters shocks, derived from the alternative identification strategy with
respect to the two proxies.
In response to the Ramey shock, the narrative news variable jumps by four percentage
points, as expected from the identification strategy that maximises the contribution of the
shock to the variable. The jump is followed by a gradual increase of spending which peaks
after a year. Broadly, the responses to the Ramey shock are also similar to those from the
standard identification and within the credible bands, despite the shocks are empirically
unrelated. Conversely, when considering the reactions to the Fisher-Peters shock, these
conclusions significantly change. The dissimilarity is partly due to different timing, seen
as an immediate jump in the excess returns at date 0 while government spending sets to
a long-lasting growth path.
Unlike the previously employed empirical strategies, the noncausal VAR approach can
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assess the connection between the structurally identified shock and the empirical proxies,
as the error term need not be unanticipated. According to this investigation, the proxies
based on the narrative news and excess returns are unlikely to measure the same variation
that is captured by the structurally imposed exclusion restrictions. Therefore, the use
of these proxies does not directly alleviate the predictability problem of the shock of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The different results rather stem from factors unrelated to
nonfundamentalness such as from the validity of identifying restrictions.
4 Conclusions
This paper addressed the question of the implications of a government spending shock in
the face of anticipation. Any empirical strategy attempting to quantify these effects con-
fronts an econometric issue with the timing of the shock as the economic agents are likely
to have a larger information set than the model assumes. I resolved the issue of deficient
information with the noncausal VAR that is able to incorporate expectations but simul-
taneously retains the advantages of the VAR methodology by imposing few assumptions
on the underlying economy. The analysis of fiscal policy could then be proceeded with a
standard identification strategy to recover an anticipated government spending shock.
The noncausal VAR methodology deviates from the forecast error interpretation of the
residual but – despite anticipation – facilitates conducting conventional structural analysis.
In a simple model of fiscal foresight, I analytically showed that the noncausal model is
able to solve the noninvertibility problem. Even though a similar mapping may not exist
in a more general setting, the lead terms of the model flexibly are expected to capture
anticipation dismissed under invertibility. Importantly, the approach does not rule out the
causal case a priori as invertibility of the underlying MA representation is nested in the
framework.
In the U.S. postwar economy, the estimated spending shock induced an increase in the
forward-looking variables during the anticipatory phase. Spending also turned out to be
followed by rising consumption, worked hours and wages, whereas investment was found to
decrease as soon as the spending shock materialises. Together, these movements implied a
fiscal multiplier close to unity. Importantly, the anticipatory forces are important to take
into consideration as they have effect on the measured fiscal multiplier and on the overall
impact of forward-looking variables. I also revisited two prominent alternative strategies
based on the proxy variables that attempt to circumvent the nonfundamentalness problem.
Notably, a proxy to catch the expectations is unlikely to measure the same variation
identified by the exclusion restrictions.
Finally, I consider the following areas useful for further research. First, the non-
causal approach is readily available for the study of government spending shocks in other
economies, as research can be employed using conventional macroeconomic data only,
without engaging in costly and demanding data collection of proxy variables. Second, the
examination of tax policy with the noncausal model, after imposing adequate structure,
can be viewed as a useful extension. Finally, the estimation of the model was based on a
simple deviation from Gaussianity which, though, assumed cross-dependent volatility for
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the structural shocks. Furthermore, detrended variables were used because the implica-
tions of stochastic trends to the model are yet unknown. Using alternative distributions
and allowing for nonstationarity could strengthen the robustness of the approach.
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A Appendix
A.1 Estimation of the noncausal VAR(r,s)
I refer to Lanne and Luoto (2016) in the derivation of the following Gibbs sampler algo-
rithm. I additionally consider zero restrictions on the elements of Φi, i = 1, . . . , s. Let Π
and Φ be matrices stacking Π′i for i = 1, . . . , r and Φ′i for i = 1, . . . , s, respectively. Fur-
thermore, write pi = vec(Π) and φ = vec(Φ), ϑ = (pi′, φ′)′ and θ = (pi′, φ′, vech(Σ)′, λ)′. To
impose s∗ zero restrictions on matrix Φ to satisfy (9), introduce an ((n2s− s∗)× 1) vector
φr containing the unrestricted parameters of Φ and an (n2s × (n2s − s∗)) deterministic
matrix Rφ which maps the unrestricted parameters to the matrix Φ as φ = Rφφr.
The approximate conditional joint density of y = (y1, . . . , yT ) on ω = (ωr+1, . . . , ωT−s)
is
p(y|ω, θ) ≈
T−s∏
r+1
p(t(ϑ)|ωt,Σ)
with
p(t|ωt,Σ) = ω
n/2
t
(2pi)n/2|Σ|1/2 exp
(
−12ωtt(ϑ)
′Σ−1t(ϑ)
)
,
t(ϑ) = vt(φ)−
r∑
j=1
Πj(pi)vt−j(φ),
and
vt(φ) = yt − Φ1(φ)yt+1 − . . .− Φs(φ)yt+s.
The prior distributions are set as follows: pi ∼ N(pi, V pi)I(pi), φr ∼ N(φr, V φr)I(φ),
Σ ∼ iW(S, ν) and λ ∼ Exp(λ), where I(·) is indicator function equal to 1 when the
polynomial to which pi or φ is mapped is stable and iW denotes the inverse Wishart
distribution. Furthermore, define the following matrices. First, stack y∗t = ω
1/2
t Π(L)yt to
a (T−r−s)n×1 vector y∗, and X∗t = ω1/2t Π(L)Xt to a (T−r−s)n×sn2 matrix X∗, where
Xt = In ⊗ [y′t+1 · · · y′t+s]′. Define similarly matrices Y and U by stacking v∗t = ω1/2t v′t(φ)
and U∗t = ω
1/2
t [v′t−1(φ) · · · v′t−r(φ)]′, respectively, for t = r + 1, . . . , T − s.
Following Lanne and Luoto (2016), the full conditional posterior distribution of φr can
be derived as
φr|y, pi,Σ, ω ∼N(φ¯r, V¯φr)I(φ), φ = Rφφr
V¯ −1φr = V
−1
φr
+R′φX∗′ΩX∗Rφ, φ¯ = V¯φr
(
V −1φr φr +R
′
φX∗′ΩY∗
)
and Ω = IT−r−s ⊗ Σ−1. The conditional distribution of pi reads as
pi|y, φ,Σ, ω ∼N(p¯i, V¯pi)I(pi),
V¯ −1pi = V −1pi + Σ−1 ⊗U′U, p¯i = V¯pi
(
V −1pi φ+ vec
(
U′YΣ−1
))
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Defining further S¯ = S + E′E, E = Y −UΠ and ν¯ = ν + T − s − r, the conditional
posterior distribution for Σ is
Σ|y, pi, φ, ω ∼iW(S¯, ν¯).
The remaining paremeters ω = (ωr+1, . . . , ωT−r−s) and λ are jointly drawn from(
λ+ t(ϑ)′Σ−1t(ϑ)
)
ωt|y, pi, φ,Σ, λ ∼ χ2(λ+ n), t = r + 1, . . . , T − s
and with Metropolis-within-Gibbs step from kernel
p(λ|y, ω) ∝
(
2λ/2Γ(λ/2)
)−(T−r−s)
λλ(T−r−s)/2
(
T−s∏
t=r+1
ω
(λ−2)/2
t
)
exp
[
−
(
1
λ
+ 12
T−s∑
t=r+1
ωt
)
λ
]
.
(A.1)
In the last step, I use the univariate normal distribution with mean equal to the mode
and variance equal to the inverse of the second hessian of the above kernel as a candidate
distribution. The standard Metropolis-Hastings acceptance probability is computed using
(A.1).
In the empirical analysis, I use the following Minnesota-Litterman type prior distribu-
tion. I set the means of pi and φr, pi and φr, to 0, and the coefficients are assumed, a priori,
independent by having zeros on the off-diagonals of covariance matrices V pi and V φr . On
the other hand, σ2pi,ijl and σ2φr,ijl, the diagonal elements of V pi and V φr corresponding to
the lth lag or lead of variable j in equation i are given by
σpi,iil =
γ1,pi
lγ3
, σpi,ijl = γ2
γ1,pi
lγ3
σi
σj
, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n, l = 1, . . . , r,
σφr,iil =
γ1,φ
lγ3
, σφr,ijl = γ2
γ1,φ
lγ3
σi
σj
, i = 2, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n, l = 1, . . . , s,
where σi is estimated as the residual standard error from a univariate autoregression with
r + s lags on the ith variable, γ1,pi and γ1,φ control for overall tightness, γ2 for relative
tightness and γ3 is a decay parameter for more distant lags and leads. For these hyper-
parameters, I use values γ1,pi = 0.2, γ2 = 0.5 and γ3 = 1, standard in the Bayesian VAR
literature. Additionally, I set γ1,φ = 0.15, which shrinks the lead coefficients moderately
but somewhat more towards zero. Last, I use the following values for the remaining hyper-
parameters: S = (ν−n− 1)diag(σ21, . . . , σ2n) with degrees-of-freedom parameter ν = n+ 2
and λ = 10.
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A.2 Further empirical results
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(a) VAR(4,4) with inflation and interest rates
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(b) VAR(4,4) with consumption and investment components
Figure A.1: Impulse responses of the remaining variables to the government spending
shock from the VAR models with additional variables
The graphs show the impulse responses of the remaining variables of the model not shown in Figure 4. Solid
lines and dashed lines are the median impulse responses from the noncausal VAR(4,4) and causal VAR(4) models,
respectively, to a one-standard deviation government spending shock. The dark and light grey shaded regions are
the 68 and 90 per cent, respectively, credible sets of the estimated impulse responses from the noncausal model.
The impulse responses in panel (a) are from the 10-variable VAR including the baseline and the plotted variables.
The impulse respones in panel (b) are computed from the 10-variable VAR including the baseline variables but
consumption and investment replaced by the variables shown.
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Figure A.2: Spending shocks of the noncausal and causal VAR models
Solid grey lines and the black dashed lines show the posterior medians of the identified spending shock from the
noncausal VAR(4,4) and causal VAR(4) models, respectively.
A.3 Identification scheme with a proxy variable
To identify a shock contributing the most to a proxy, the starting point is the two-sided
MA representation of yt
yt =
∞∑
k=−∞
ΨkB¯u¯t−k,
where matrix B¯ rotates the structural shocks u¯t to the reduced-form errors t as
t = B¯u¯t.
B¯ can now be found from
B¯B¯′ = Γ¯
as E[t′t] = Γ¯ = λλ−2Σ = E[B¯u¯tu¯′tB¯′] = B¯B¯′. On the other hand, by Cholesky decomposi-
tion, Γ¯ = A¯A¯′, or, by introducing an orthogonal matrix W , Γ¯ = A¯WW ′A¯′. Consequently,
rotation of W yields B¯ = A¯W . As the interest is in one shock only, it suffices to find the
first column of W , w1 such that γ1 = A¯w1 is the first column of B¯.
The MA representation of the ith variable in yt is then
yi,t =
∞∑
k=−∞
e′iΨkA¯Wu¯t−k
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with variance
Var(yi,t) =
∞∑
k=−∞
e′iΨkA¯A¯′Ψ′kei
yi,t can further be decomposed to the contributions by the n structural shocks
yi,t =
∞∑
k=−∞
e′iΨkA¯[w1u¯1,t−k + . . .+ wnu¯n,t−k].
such that the contribution of the first shock to the variable reads as
y1i,t =
∞∑
k=−∞
e′iΨkA¯w1u¯1,t−k =
∞∑
k=−∞
e′iΨkA¯w1u¯1,t−k.
As the aim is to find a shock with the greatest contribution to the ith variable, w1 is
found by maximising
Var(y1i,t)
Var(yi,t)
=
∑∞
k=−∞ e′iΨkA¯w1w′1A¯′Ψ′kei∑∞
k=−∞ e′iΨkA¯A¯′Ψ′kei
subject to the orthogonality of W , w′1w1 = 1. By rewriting
e′iΨkA¯w1w′1A¯′Ψ′kei =tr
(
e′iΨkA¯w1w′1A¯′Ψ′kei
)
=tr
(
w′1A¯
′Ψ′keie′iΨkA¯w1
)
=tr
(
w′1A¯
′Ψ′kEiiΨkA¯w1
)
=tr
(
w′1Skw1
)
,
the nominator of the objective function is
H∑
k=−H
w′1Skw1 = w′1S¯w1
for large H. As the denominator is independent of w1, the problem can be solved by
setting up the Lagrangian
L = w′1S¯w1 − µ(w′1w1 − 1).
The first-order condition is
S¯w1 = µw1,
and since w′1µw1 = µ, the eigenvector corresponding to the maximal eigenvalue of the
positive definite matrix S¯ is the optimum.
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